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In general, it is believed important to assure, in addition,
that — (1) services rendered by the employee be in the
business, not in the household; (2) the compensation paid be
fairly reflective of the amount, type and value of services
rendered; (3) the employee's participation in management
be limited; and (4) the employee be compensated separately
for any property, such as land, provided to the business.
The self-employed deduction  
The deduction for health insurance costs of self-
employed individuals has been extended on a permanent
basis at a level of 25 percent for 1994, 30 percent in 1995
and later years.22
FOOTNOTES
1 See Harl, Agricultural Law § 57.02[1] [1995]; Harl,
Agricultural Law Manual  § 7.02[4][b][i]. See also Harl,
"Health Insurance for Employees", 2 Agric L. Dig. 201
(1991); Harl, "More on Husband-Wife Accident and
Health Plans," 5 Agric. L. Dig. 89 (1994).
2 See, e.g., Indiana Public Accountant, Oct. 1994, p.6.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g, Rev. Rul. 71-588, 1971-2 C.B. 91.
5 Id.
6 See Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5(a).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Rev. Rul. 59-265, 1959-2 C.B. 42; Rev. Rul. 55-85,
1955-1 C.B. 15.
10 Estate of Chism v. Comm’r, 322 F.2d 956 (9th Cir.
1963).
11 Treas. Reg.§ 1.105-5.
12 Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.125-1, 1.125-2
13 See Harl, Agricultural Law § 57.02[5](1995); Harl,
Agricultural Law Manual § 7.02[4][b][v](1995).
14 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2.
15 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2, Q&A 7, paragraph (a).
16 Id.
17 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2, Q&A 7, para. b(6).
18 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-1, Q&A 17.
19 815 F. Supp. 1206, 1212 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
20 Ltr. Rul. 9409006, Nov. 12, 1993.
21 Id.
22 H.R. 831, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), amending
I.R.C. § 162(l).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE.  The debtor was a partner in a horse
breeding and racing business and had obtained secured
loans from a creditor. The creditor sought to have the loans
declared nondischargeable because of fraud by the debtor in
making financial statements and for the unauthorized sale of
collateral. The Bankruptcy and District Courts held that the
creditor failed to prove that the financial statements were
false when made but that one loan was nondischargeable
because the debtor had sold the collateral without prior
consent of the creditor and without payment of the proceeds
on the loan. The appellate court reversed the second holding
because the court found that the creditor had knowledge of
the debtor’s sales of collateral without prior consent and the
creditor had failed to take steps to protect its collateral.  In
re Wolfson, 56 F.3d 52 (11th Cir. 1995), rev’g unrep. D.
Ct. dec. aff’g, 148 B.R. 638 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor owned a residence
with a fair market value of $36,000. The residence was
subject to consensual liens of $28,500 and a judgment lien
of $10,954.29. The debtor claimed a homestead exemption
for the amount of equity after the consensual liens and
sought to avoid the judicial lien as impairing that
exemption. The case was filed after amendment of Section
522(f). The court had previously ruled that, under case law,
the judicial lien was avoidable only to the extent of the
debtor’s exemption amount, $7,500. Under the new statute,
the court added the amount of consensual liens, the
exemption amount and the judicial lien, $46,954.29. This
amount exceeded the debtor’s interest in the residence
without any liens, $36,000, by $10,954.29; therefore, the
judicial lien of $10,954.29 was avoidable in its entirety. As
the court noted in quoting from the legislative history of the
amendment of Section 522(f), the formula effectively allows
complete avoidance of judicial liens if the debtor seeks an
exemption for the amount of equity remaining after
consensual liens. In re Jones, 183 B.R. 93 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1995).
IRA. In 1991, the debtor rolled over funds from a
terminated pension plan to an IRA. The debtor filed for
Chapter 7 in 1994 and claimed $286,000 in the IRA as
exempt under Mass. Gen. Law, ch 235, § 34. The trustee
objected to the exemption to the extent the rolled over
amount exceeded 7 percent of the debtor’s total income for
the five years before the bankruptcy filing. The debtor
argued that the 7 percent limit did not apply to rolled over
funds but only applied to new deposits. The court held that
the statute was unambiguous and limited the IRA exemption
to an amount equal to 7 percent of the debtor’s income for
the five pre-petition years. In re Goldman, 182 B.R. 622
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
GRAIN ELEVATORS. The debtors owned and
operated grain elevators. The Missouri Department of
Agriculture (the Department) obtained a state court order to
seize the debtor’s grain-related assets and seized the
debtors’ grain-related assets and placed the proceeds in an
escrow account for the grain producers who had grain stored
with the debtors. The Department held hearings to
determine the amount of the producers’ claims and issued an
order for the distribution of the grain proceeds. That order
became final when no one objected within 30 days after the
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order. One day before the distribution was to take place, the
debtors filed for Chapter 11 and sought to include the grain
proceeds for distribution under the plan.  The Department
filed for relief from the automatic stay. The court held that
the Department was entitled to relief from the automatic
stay because (1) the producers retained title to the grain
under a bailment relationship with the debtors and (2) the
state court order was valid and finally determined the claims
of the producers prior to the bankruptcy filing. In re
Childress, 182 B.R. 545 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995).
RECLAMATION. The debtor was in the business of
raising, fattening and marketing cattle. The debtor sold
cattle purchased from several producers without paying the
sellers and the sellers sought recovery of the purchase price
of the cattle from the proceeds of the sales still in the
bankruptcy estate. The sellers sought recovery under the
state reclamation statute, Minn. Stat. 336.2-507(2), the
bankruptcy reclamation law, Section 546(c), and the Packers
and Stockyard Act trust fund. The court held that the sellers
were not entitled to recovery of the proceeds as a PSA trust
fund because the notification requirements were not met.
The court also held that the state reclamation statute was not
complied with because the livestock sales were not cash
sales in that the sellers had made several sales over the years
to the debtors and allowed payment from 4 to 10 days after
the sale, thus establishing a course of conduct that the sales
were short term credit sales. Under Minn. Stat. § 336.2-702,
credit sellers also had a right of reclamation but the court
held that bankruptcy law, Section 546(c), also had to be met
in order for the sellers to recover. Although the court held
that the sellers had complied with Section 546(c), recovery
was denied because the cattle had been sold and slaughtered
by the time the reclamation notice was given by the sellers.
The court held that the reclamation rights did not carry over
to the proceeds. In re Morken, 182 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DEATH OF DEBTOR. The debtor had filed for
Chapter 12 and had a plan confirmed. The debtor continued
to operate a nursery business and was current on the plan
payments until the debtor’s death. The business was
operated with the help of the debtor’s family. The debtor’s
son petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for the authority to
continue the business and make the plan payments for the
remainder of the plan. No objections were made by the
trustee or creditors. However, the court held that it had no
authority to appoint anyone to the position of debtor-in-
possession other than the trustee. Because there was no one
to replace the debtor (the trustee refused to take possession
of the estate business), the court ruled that it would dismiss
the case after allowing the parties time to respond to the
ruling. In re Erickson, 183 B.R. 189 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1995).
PLAN. The debtors’ schedule of creditors listed a tax
liability to a county for property taxes owed. However, no
claim was filed by the county or the debtors and the Chapter
12 plan did not provide for payment of the tax liability. The
plan provided generally for payment of unsecured creditors
but did not specifically mention the tax claim or priority
unsecured claims. The court held that because no claim was
filed and the plan did not specifically provide for payment
of the claim, no payments were to be made to the county
from the estate funds. In re Drebes, 182 B.R. 873 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1995), aff’d on reconsideration, 182  B.R. 875
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The IRS was not listed as a creditor on the
debtor’s schedules and the IRS did not receive notice of the
case, the creditors’ meeting or the bar date for claims.
However, the IRS received actual notice of the case from
several sources but failed to file its priority tax claim until
after the bar date. The court held that, although the tax claim
was untimely filed, untimeliness was insufficient cause to
deny the IRS priority tax claim. The court cited In re Pacific
Atlantic Trading Co., 33 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir 1994); In re
Vecchio, 20 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 1994). In re Vancardo, 182
B.R. 543 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
DEDUCTIONS. The Chapter 7 trustee filed corporate
income tax returns for the debtor corporation which reported
income and expenses on the accrual method of accounting.
The trustee filed amended returns deducting expenses for
accrued post-petition interest on general unsecured claims
filed in the case. The corporation was insolvent throughout
the bankruptcy case. The IRS denied the deductions.  Under
I.R.C. § 461, an interest deduction would not be deductible
under the accrual method of accounting until the taxpayer
became liable “in all events” for the expense. The court held
that the estate would not be liable “in all events” for the
post-petition interest until the estate had paid all unsecured
claims and had property remaining to pay the interest.
During the taxable years of the bankruptcy case, the debtor
was insolvent so that no property would remain after
payment of all unsecured creditors; therefore, the interest
claims did not accrue during the bankruptcy case. In re
West Texas Marketing Corp., 54 F.3d 1194 (5th Cir.
1995), aff’g, 155 B.R. 399 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtors failed to file and pay their
federal income taxes for 1981 through 1988 until one debtor
was convicted of failing to file income tax returns. The 1981
through 1983 returns had to be reconstructed by the IRS and
the debtors filed the 1984 through 1988 returns. The IRS
assessed the taxes due and the debtors made some payments
but a substantial amount remained unpaid when the debtors
filed for bankruptcy. The debtors argued that the IRS failed
to prove that they committed an “affirmative act” to evade
payment of the taxes. The court held that the failure to file
and pay taxes for eight years was sufficient conduct to make
the taxes nondischargeable for willful attempt to evade taxes
under Section 523(a)(1)(C). Matter of Bruner, 55 F.3d 195
(5th Cir. 1995).
PARTNERSHIPS. The debtor was a farm partnership
with three partners who also filed individual bankruptcy
cases. The partnership business incurred post-petition
taxable income which was passed through to the partners.
The partners sought to have the partnership distribute
sufficient funds to pay the partners’ individual tax liability
created by the partnership income as an administrative
expense. A creditor objected because the funds distributed
to pay the taxes would decrease the distributions to the
partnership’s creditors. The court held that the partners’
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claim would not be allowed because under the partnership
agreement, state law and federal tax law, the partners were
individually responsible for paying the tax on partnership
income. In re Green, 182 B.R. 532 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1995).
TAX LIEN. The debtor sought to avoid a federal tax
lien on the grounds that the lien was not perfected. The lien
was filed under “  Cary Reid” instead of the debtor’s correct
name, “  Gary Reid.” The debtor presented evidence of two
title examiners who made a lien record examination of the
first name and did not list any liens against the second name
in the search reports. The court ruled that the tax lien filing
was not sufficiently close to the debtor’s name to perfect the
lien and allowed the debtor to avoid the lien. In re Reid,
182 B.R. 443 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995).
CONTRACTS
BREACH OF WARRANTY . The plaintiff purchased
potato seed from one of the defendants, the seller, which
was certified by the Federal-State Inspection Service (FSIS)
and the Idaho Crop Improvement Association (ICIA). A
sample of the seed was later found to have been infected
with bacterial ring rot (BRR) and the plaintiff’s crop was
found to be infected with BRR. The plaintiff sued for breach
of implied and express warranty by the seller and negligent
misrepresentation by FSIS and ICIA. The plaintiff sought
recovery of the loss in value of infected seeds and loss in
value of the resulting crop. The seller argued that
disclaimers on the seeds insulated it from liability for
damages. The court held that there remained substantial
questions of fact involving the effectiveness of the
disclaimers, the reliance by the plaintiff on the warranties,
and the industry practices involving the warranties.  Duffin
v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass’n, 895 P.2d 1195 (Idaho
1995).
OPTIONS. The plaintiff entered into an agreement with
the defendants for the defendants to purchase the plaintiff's
farm from a creditor, to lease the farm to the plaintiff for
two years, and to give the plaintiff the option to repurchase
the farm within those two years. The option agreement
required payment of $50.00 by the plaintiff but the
defendants refused to accept payment when it was offered.
The plaintiff tendered money in exercise of the option but
the defendants refused, saying that the option agreement
was not valid because the plaintiff failed to pay the
consideration required. The court held that the plaintiff’s
tender of money was sufficient to exercise the option
because the tender occurred before the defendants revoked
the option for nonpayment. In addition, the court held that
the defendants were equitably estopped from revoking the
option for lack of consideration because the defendants
refused the offered payment of the consideration. I.R. Kirk




BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].* The
defendants had borrowed funds from the FmHA (now
CFSA) which were secured by farm land. The defendants
defaulted on the loan and filed for bankruptcy. Their
bankruptcy plan was confirmed and the case was closed.
The defendants inquired about loan restructuring but were
told to contact the FmHA in a few months. The FmHA sent
a notice of loan restructuring rights to the defendants’
bankruptcy attorney as required by 7 C.F.R. § 1951.907 and
also sent notice by certified mail to the defendants, although
notice to the defendants was not required. The notice was
signed by the defendants’ son who did not give the
defendants the letter. The FmHA eventually denied the
defendants any loan restructuring because the defendants
did not timely request restructuring. The defendants argued
that notice was insufficient because the defendants did not
receive actual notice of their restructuring rights. The court
held that the FmHA more than complied with its regulations
and that the certified mailing of notice to the defendants was
legally sufficient. U.S. v. Birchem, 883 F. Supp. 1334 (D.
S.D. 1995).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
adopted as final regulations adding the fig crop insurance
provisions to the common crop regulations. 60 Fed. Reg.
37934 (July 25, 1995).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations amending the
late and prevented planting provisions of the corn, grain
sorghum and soybean endorsements. The regulations also
add the late and prevented planting coverage into the hybrid
sorghum seed, rice, cotton, barley, oats and wheat crop
endorsements. 60 Fed. Reg. 37933 (July 25, 1995).
HERBICIDES. The plaintiff was a cotton producer who
purchased two defoliants. The label and mixing instructions
included with the one defoliant were incorrect and the
plaintiff claimed the error caused damage to the cotton crop.
The plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer and
sellers for (1) strict liability for failure to provide adequate
warnings, (2) negligent failure to adequately test the
product, (3) breach of express warranty by the seller, (4)
breach of implied warranty of merchantability against the
seller, and (5) breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose against the seller. The defendants argued
that the actions were barred by pre-emption of FIFRA. The
court held that all the actions were pre-empted by FIFRA
because each action was based on the adequacy of the label.
Taylor Ag Industries v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555 (9th Cir.
1995).
POULTRY INSPECTION. The FSIS has adopted as
final regulations requiring that all poultry and poultry
products imported into the United States have been subject
to inspection requirements “equivalent to” the requirements
in the United States. 60 Fed. Reg. 38667 (July 28, 1995).
TUBERCULOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations providing for payment of indemnities for cervids
destroyed because of a tuberculosis infection. The
regulations also provide for indemnities for destruction of
cattle, bison and cervids exposed to tuberculosis infected
animals. 60 Fed. Reg. 37804 (July 24, 1995).
TOBACCO. The CFSA (formerly ASCS) has issued
proposed regulations to define warehouse to exclude places
which have contracted with a cooperative marketing
association to make CCC price support advances to
producers on behalf of the association and to which
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producers deliver tobacco for display and auction. This
amendment removes such warehouses from the jurisdiction
of the USWA tobacco warehouse regulations. 60 Fed. Reg.
38766 (July 28, 1995).
The CCC has adopted as final regulations for the 1995
marketing quota ranges for tobacco:
   Kind and Type                                                                                   Million pounds  
Virginia fire-cured(type 21) 1.95
Ky-Tenn. fire-cured(types 22-23) 39.8
Maryland (type 32) 6.45
Dark air-cured(types 35-36) 9.6
Virginia sun-cured(type 37) 0.13
Cigar filler & binder(types 42-44, 53-55) 9.0
Cigar filler (type 46) 0
Cigar binder (types 51-52) .675
The 1995 tobacco price support levels are as follows:
   Kind and Type                                                                                  Cents per pound  
Virginia fire-cured(type 21) 143.0
Ky-Tenn. fire-cured(types 22-23) 151.8
Dark air-cured(types 35-36) 130.4
Virginia sun-cured(type 37) 127.6
Cigar filler & binder(types 42-44, 53-55) 110.1
Cigar filler (type 46) 86.1
60 Fed. Reg. 38229 (July 26, 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ANNUITIES-ALM § 6.04.* The decedent had been
injured in a gun accident and had sued the gun manufacturer
for the personal injuries. Under the settlement agreement,
the defendant corporation’s insurance company purchased
an annuity from a third corporation. The annuity provided
for monthly payments for the decedent’s lifetime or at least
30 years, with any remaining payments due after the
decedent’s death to be paid to the decedent’s parents. The
decedent died before the 30 years passed. The decedent’s
estate sought to discount the value of the annuity interest
included in the decedent’s estate by the value of the
possibility that the annuity company would default on the
payments to the parents. The IRS ruled that the present
value of the annuity payments to the parents was included in
the decedent’s gross estate under I.R.C. § 2039 and that no
discount would be allowed for the mere possibility that the
annuity company would default on the payments. Ltr. Rul.
9530002, April 14, 1995.
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedents were
husband and wife who died within two days of each other.
The couple had owned bank accounts, certificates of deposit
and bonds in tenancy by the entirety. The executor of the
second spouse to die filed a written disclaimer of the
surviving spouse’s survivorship interest in the property
within nine months after the death of the first spouse. Under
Pennsylvania law, a tenancy by the entirety cannot be
terminated or partitioned unilaterally. The IRS ruled that the
disclaimers were effective. Ltr. Rul. 9529001, March 22,
1995.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].*  A trust was created in 1918 for the daughter of the
grantor. The trust provided for successive trusts for the issue
of the daughter until 20 years after the death of the last
remainder holder alive at the death of the grantor. One of
the great great grandchildren was an adopted minor and a
dispute arose among the remainder holders as to whether an
adopted child was an eligible remainder holder. A
settlement was reached by the parties to allow the adopted
child to succeed to a portion of the trust. The IRS ruled that
the settlement agreement was reasonable given the unsettled
law in the state involved; therefore, the settlement did not
result in a gift to any person nor did the settlement result in
the trust being subject to GSST. Ltr. Rul. 9528012, April
13, 1995.
A 1940 trust currently had one main beneficiary and five
subtrusts, one for that beneficiary and one each for four
other beneficiaries. The IRS ruled that the division of the
trust into five separate trusts would not subject the trusts to
GSTT because the division did not change the beneficial
interests of the beneficiaries. Ltr. Rul. 9528026, April 18,
1995.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s surviving spouse was charged with the
decedent’s murder. Under state law, the surviving spouse
was prohibited from inheriting any property from the
decedent if the surviving spouse was convicted of second
degree murder. Before the criminal trial, the heirs and
surviving spouse reached a settlement under which the
surviving spouse received the residence and payments under
the decedent’s pension plans. The spouse was convicted of
second degree murder. The decedent’s estate claimed a
marital deduction for the property received by the spouse
under the agreement. The IRS ruled that the settlement
property was not eligible for the marital deduction because
the settlement did not negate the need for future judicial
proceedings to determine the spouse’s rights to the estate
property, since the criminal proceedings were not affected
by the settlement. The IRS ruled that the property passing to
the spouse passed by means of the parties’ division of the
estate and not the passing of property from the estate by
inheritance.  Ltr. Rul. 9530003, April 18, 1995.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The decedent had
established a trust which currently has the surviving spouse
as trustee and sole beneficiary and the decedent’s heirs as
remainder holders. The trust authorized the trustee to invade
corpus for the health, support, and maintenance of the
remainder holders when they become beneficiaries. The
trust also had a spendthrift clause preventing the assignment
or encumbrance of a beneficiary's interest in the trust. The
spendthrift clause also contained a provision that the trustee
could discontinue income payments directly to a beneficiary
and instead make payments for the health, support, and
maintenance of the beneficiary. The IRS ruled that the
surviving spouse did not have a power of appointment over
the trust corpus. Ltr. Rul. 9529021, April 24, 1995.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[3].* Shortly before the decedent’s death, the
decedent’s daughter died, leaving her estate to her brother.
The brother told the decedent that some of the property
would have to be sold to pay the sister’s estate taxes. The
decedent did not want any property sold and agreed to lend
the son the necessary funds for the taxes. The son gave the
decedent a promissory note but the note did not provide any
interest or repayment schedule and the decedent included a
clause that the note was to be forgiven upon the decedent’s
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death. The decedent was seriously ill during this time and
died a month later. The court held that the loaned funds
were included in the decedent’s estate because the decedent
did not receive adequate consideration for the transfer and
the decedent retained an interest in the funds. Estate of




IRA. When the taxpayer’s employer terminated the
company’s profit-sharing plan, the taxpayer received a lump
sum distribution. The proceeds were placed in an IRA for
the taxpayer’s spouse. The court held that the rollover of the
funds was not eligible for tax-free treatment because the
funds were not rolled over to a qualifying plan for the
taxpayer. Rodoni v. Comm’r, 105 T.C. No. 3 (1995).
PENSION PLANS . For plans beginning in July 1995,
the weighted average is 7.23 percent with the permissible
range of 6.51 to 7.88 percent (90 to 109 percent permissable
range) and 6.54 to 7.6 percent (90 to 110  percent
permissable range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 95-42,
I.R.B. 1995-31, 4.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
August 1995
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.73 5.65 5.61 5.58
110% AFR 6.32 6.22 6.17 6.14
120% AFR 6.89 6.78 6.72 6.69
Mid-term
AFR 6.04 5.95 5.91 5.88
110% AFR 6.66 6.55 6.50 6.46
120% AFR 7.27 7.14 7.08 7.04
Long-term
AFR 6.56 6.46 6.41 6.37
110% AFR 7.24 7.11 7.05 7.01
120% AFR 7.90 7.75 7.68 7.63
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The court held
that an S corporation with less than 10 shareholders was not
exempt from the unified audit and litigation procedures as a
small S corporation for taxable years with a tax return due
date prior to January 30, 1987.  Twenty-Three Nineteen
Creekside, Inc. v. Comm'r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
(9th Cir. 1995), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1991-271, reaff'g T.C.
Memo. 1990-649.
DEFINITION. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
governing the qualification for taxation of a corporation as
an S corporation.
The regulations provide that corporations ineligible for S
corporation status include (1) members of affiliated groups,
(2) insurance companies, (3) corporations to which an I.R.C.
§ 936 election applies, (4) a financial institution to which
I.R.C. §§ 585 or 593 applies; and (5) a DISC or former
DISC. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(d). A corporation is not a
member of an affiliated group of two corporations if the
other corporation is inactive during the taxable year of the S
corporation election. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(d)(3).
 An S corporation cannot have more than 35
shareholders. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(e). For purposes of
this rule, the shareholder is the person for whom stock is
being held by a nominee, guardian, custodian, or agent. A
decedent’s estate is considered the shareholder. The deemed
owner of a subpart E trust is considered the shareholder.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(e)(1). Stock owned by a husband,
wife or both (or their estates) is treated as held by one
shareholder regardless of the form of ownership. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1361-1(e)(2).
S corporations may not have nonresident aliens as
shareholders. Similarly, a nonresident alien spouse of a U.S.
citizen shareholder may not own any current interest in the
stock.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(g)(1).
Although trusts are not allowed to be shareholders, an
exception is provided for (1) qualified subpart E trusts, (2)
subpart E trusts which no longer are qualified after the death
of the deemed owner, (3) qualified Subchapter S trusts
(QSSTs), (4) testamentary trusts (limited to 60 days after the
stock is transferred to the trust), and (5) voting trusts in
which the beneficial owners are treated as the owners of
their shares of the trust under subpart E. Treas. Reg. §
1.1361-1(h)(1). In general, a subpart E trust remains an
eligible shareholder for 60 days after the owner’s death but
may continue to be eligible for up to two years if the entire
trust corpus is includible in the owner’s estate. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1361-1(h)(1)(ii). An eligible voting trust must provide
for (1) the delegation of the right to vote the shares to one or
more trustees, (2) distributions for the stock to or for all the
beneficial owners, (3) delivery of possession of the stock to
the beneficial owners upon termination of the trust, and (4)
termination of the trust on a specific date or event. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1361-1(h)(1)(v).
The shareholder of a subpart E trust is the deemed
owner. The owner of stock in a decedent’s estate is the
estate until the end of the applicable 60 day or two year
period. The shareholder of a voting trust is each beneficial
owner as determined under subpart E. Treas. Reg. §
1.1361-1(h)(1)(3).
The requirements for a QSST generally follow the
statute. The regulations provide that, if a husband and wife
are the income beneficiaries of a QSST, both are U.S.
citizens or residents, and they file joint returns, they are
treated as only one shareholder. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-
1(j)(2)(i). A trust is not a QSST if the income from the trust
satisfies a support obligation of the grantor to the income
beneficiary. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(j)(2)(i)(B) . A trust does
not qualify as a QSST if any person has the power to
appoint trust income or corpus to anyone other than the
current income beneficiary, unless the power of
appointment results in the trust being a subpart E trust.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(j)(2)(iii). A QSST may hold stock
in a trust for which a QTIP estate tax marital election has
been made. However, a QSST may not hold stock in a trust
for which a gift tax QTIP marital election has been made.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(j)(4).
The regulations provide the requirements for making a
QSST election and provide for a protective QSST election
for subpart E trusts. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(j)(6).
Upon the death of a beneficiary of a QSST, the
beneficiary’s estate continues as eligible shareholder for 60
days. The period is extended to two years if the entire trust
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corpus is included in the beneficiary’s estate. Any
community interest in the trust held by a surviving spouse is
disregarded. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(j)(7). A successive
income beneficiary of a QSST trust is deemed to have
agreed to the election unless the successive beneficiary
affirmatively refuses to consent to the election. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1361-1(j)(9), (10). A QSST election may be revoked
only with the consent of the Commissioner. Treas. Reg. §
1.1361-1(j)(11). 60 Fed. Reg. 37578 (July 21, 1995).
INADVERTENT TERMINATION. An S corporation
had one shareholder and one class of stock, common. The
corporation issued preferred stock to a second shareholder,
causing the termination of the S corporation status. When
the termination was discovered by the corporation’s
accountant, the preferred stock was redeemed and voting
common stock was issued to the second shareholder. The
IRS ruled that the termination was inadvertent and did not
affect the S corporation status. Ltr. Rul. 9529020, April 24,
1995.
SHAREHOLDER’S BASIS. The taxpayer was the sole
shareholder of an S corporation and had transferred funds to
the corporation. The taxpayer claimed that the transfers
were loans, although the corporation did not give any
promissory notes, did not make any book entries for the
loans or otherwise authorize the loans. The taxpayer also
failed to identify the source of the funds transferred to the
corporation. The court held that the taxpayer could not
increase the basis of the taxpayer’s interest in the
corporation and denied pass-through of net operating losses
because the taxpayer did not have sufficient basis in the
interest in the corporation. Bolding v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1995-326.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer had erroneously
taken the I.R.C. § 121 exclusion for gain on the sale of a
residence for persons aged 55 or older on a previous sale of
a residence. The taxpayer took a second exclusion of gain
on the sale of a second residence when the taxpayer was
over age 55, arguing that the first exclusion was void. The
court denied the second exclusion on the basis of the
doctrine of the duty of consistency because the statute of
limitations had expired on the first exclusion. Koppen v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-316.
The taxpayer had owned a former residence with a
former spouse and had received the residence as part of the
divorce settlement. The house was sold after the divorce for
a gain. The taxpayer remarried and purchased a house
jointly with the new spouse. Although the new residence
had a cost exceeding the sale price of the previous
residence, the value of the taxpayer’s ownership share in the
first house exceeded the value of the taxpayer’s ownership
share of the second house. The court held that because the
houses involved were not the principal residences of the
same husband and wife, only the values of the taxpayer’s
shares could be considered in determining whether the
transactions qualified for gain deferment. Because the value
of the taxpayer’s second house share did not exceed the
value of the first house share, the taxpayer’s entire gain
from the sale of the first house had to be included in the
taxpayer’s income. Snowa v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-
336.
The taxpayer was an administrator of the property of a
missing person. In anticipation that the missing person
would be declared legally dead, the administrator sold the
missing person’s residence and sought a ruling that the sale
would be eligible for the one-time exclusion of gain since
the missing person was over 55 years old. The IRS ruled
that the ability of an administrator (or other fiduciary) to
make the Section 121 election required an affirmative action
or intent by the decedent or missing person to sell the
residence before the person died or became missing such
that the fiduciary was merely completing the sale. Because
the missing person here had not begun any plans to sell the
residence, the administrator could not make the election
upon the sale of the residence. Ltr. Rul. 9530020, April 28,
1995.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT. The taxpayers entered into an
agreement to construct a poultry confinement building and
to raise poultry for a third party. The taxpayers were
responsible for all aspects of the operation. The taxpayers
claimed the payments from the third party under the
agreement as rental income and did not pay self-
employment taxes on the income. The court held that the
payments were self-employment income because the
taxpayers performed substantial personal services in
exchange for the payments. Gill v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1995-328.
NEGLIGENCE
POTATO SEEDS. The plaintiff purchased potato seed
from one of the defendants, the seller, which was certified
by the Federal-State Inspection Service (FSIS) and the
Idaho Crop Improvement Association (ICIA). A sample of
the seed was later found to have been infected with bacterial
ring rot (BRR) and the plaintiff’s crop was found to be
infected with BRR. The plaintiff sued for breach of implied
and express warranty by the seller and negligent
misrepresentation by FSIS and ICIA. The plaintiff sought
recovery of the loss in value of infected seeds and loss in
value of the resulting crop. The FSIS and ICIA argued that
economic losses were not recoverable in tort. The court held
that an exception was allowed in this case because of the
special relationship between the parties in which it would be
equitable to impose a duty on the parties not to inflict
economic loss. The court held that the negligence action
was allowed against ICIA because of the reliance on the
expertise of the ICIA by the plaintiff. However, no such
special relationship existed with the FSIS so that action was
dismissed. The court also held that the ICIA was not
protected by governmental immunity by the Idaho Tort
Claims Act. However, the court held that the action for
negligent misrepresentation against the ICIA was not
allowed because that cause of action was allowed only in
cases involving professional relationships. Duffin v. Idaho
Crop Improvement Ass’n, 895 P.2d 1195 (Idaho 1995);
Feld v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass’n, 895 P.2d 1207
(Idaho 1995).
CITATION UPDATES
Holl v. Comm'r, 54 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'g
and rem'g, 101 T.C. 455 (1993), on rem. from 967 F.2d






PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. For over 40 years the
defendants used a 10 foot wide path over the plaintiffs’ land
for access to their farm land. In 1991, the defendants
bulldozed the path to widen it to 30 feet wide and the
plaintiffs closed off the path with a gate and sought
damages for the loss of trees. The defendants argued that
they had a prescriptive easement over the path that was 30
feet wide. The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiffs
but allowed only $6.40 in damages. The appellate court
sustained the judgment except to remand for a new trial on
the damages because the evidence supported a much greater
award based on the value of the cut trees and the eligibility
of the plaintiff for treble damages under Mo. Rev. Stat. §
537.340. The court held that treble damages were allowed
even though the defendants were on the land with
permission because the cutting of the trees exceeded the
scope of that permission. The court upheld the trial court’s
ruling granting the plaintiffs’ revocation of the permission
to use the path. Anderson v. Howald, 897 S.W.2d 176
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
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